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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE 
WTO: SOME SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
CARLos MANUEL V AzQUEZ* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Among international organizations, the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) is widely credited with having the most effective dis-
pute settlement system. Its highly developed dispute settlement 
system, which is one of the few in international law to include a 
standing appellate body, invites comparisons to the institution of 
judicial review in the United States under the paradigm of Marbury 
v. Madison. l Such a comparison yields insights about both the 
WTO dispute settlement system and Marbury-style judicial review. 
This Article first notes an important parallel between the two sys-
tems: like the WTO, judicial review in the United States began as 
the refinement of a flawed treaty-based system. Mter describing 
how the two institutions developed from flawed treaty regimes, this 
Article examines some important structural differences between 
how the two institutions exercise 'Judicial review," as well as one 
feature of the WTO that is sometimes thought to distinguish it 
from other legal regimes, but in fact does not. The Article con-
cludes with some reflections on what the differences between the 
two systems tell us about the necessary elements of an effective 
legal system. 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WTO AS 
THE REFINEMENT OF FLAWED TREAlY-BASED REGIMES 
A. The Treaty-Based Origins of judicial Review in the United States 
The Articles of Confederation (Articles)-the constitutive docu-
ment in force in the United States between independence and the 
adoption of the Constitution-were basically a treaty among the 
thirteen states. The Articles operated on the states as political bod-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. (1979), Yale; J.D. 
(1983), Columbia. Professor Vazquez is a member of the District of Columbia Bar. He is 
grateful to Jane Bradley, Steve Charnovitz, Vicki Jackson, and Daniel Tarullo for helpful 
comments, and to Siobhan Briley for helpful research assistance. 
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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ies, and not directly on the individuals in the states. They imposed 
obligations on the states, but lacked a mechanism for enforcing 
those obligations. In enumerating the flaws of the Articles, the 
framers of the Constitution compared the Articles to a "mere 
Treaty" because they depended on the good faith of the parties for 
their efficacy.2 The states failed to meet their federal obligations, 
however, and the federal government lacked the power to compel 
them to comply. Their experience under the Articles convinced 
the framers that a government comprised of separate states could 
not depend on "good faith" to secure the states' compliance with 
their federal obligations.3 
To address this problem, the framers replaced the Articles' 
treaty regime with a true federal government. Their most impor-
tant modification of the treaty regime was to empower the federal 
government to direct its legislation to the individuals in the 
nation.4 The federal government was given the power to regulate 
commerce among the states and with foreign nations, among other 
legislative powers, and to tax the people to provide for the general 
welfare.5 The federal government would no longer depend on the 
states to provide it with necessary funds or to implement and 
enforce federal directives. The Constitution operated directly on 
individuals, and could be enforced through the courts. 6 The Con-
stitution also provided for federal courts, establishing a Supreme 
Court to review decisions of state courts regarding federal law, and 
granting Congress the power to establish lower federal courts. 7 
The Constitution imposed certain obligations directly on the states, 
such as the prohibition of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.8 
To ensure compliance with federal obligations, the federal courts 
were given jurisdiction in cases arising under federal law.9 
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 77-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) . 
4. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34, 141 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) ("Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning 
and operation."); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts."). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
8. [d. art. I, § 9. 
9. [d. art III, § 2. 
HeinOnline -- 36 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 589 2004
2004] Judicial Review in the United States and the WTO 589 
Some of the framers were worried that the new federal govern-
ment would become too powerful, usurping powers not delegated 
to it and eventually obliterating the state governments. 10 The fram-
ers adopted certain safeguards to prevent such an eventuality. 
Prominent among them was the institution of judicial review. If 
the federal government exceeded its legislative powers, the framers 
assured skeptics, the courts would refuse to enforce the non-con-
forming legislative acts, thus protecting the citizenry and the states 
from the federal government's expansive tendencies. ll The power 
to nullify legislative acts that exceed the constitutional powers of 
the federal government is, of course, the, type of judicial reVIew 
later affirmed in Marbury v. Madison. 12 
B. The Development of the WTO's Dispute Settlement System 
The WTO's current dispute settlement system is likewise the 
result of the refinement of a seriously flawed treaty-based regime. 
The centerpiece of the WTO is the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).13 That treaty was originally intended to be 
administered by an international organization, the International 
Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was conceived as the third 
branch of the Bretton Woods system, the trade counterpart to the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 14 The ITO 
never came into existence, however, largely because the United 
States failed to ratify its constitutive treaty, the Havana Charter.15 
Even the GATT never came into force for all members. For some, 
including the United States, the provisions of the GATT became 
legally binding obligations by virtue of the Protocol of Provisional 
Application,16 which provided for the "provisional" application of 
the GATT for the four-plus decades of its existence. , 
Without the contemplated organization to administer it, major 
GATT decisions were taken by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
which when spelled in all caps signified the parties to the GATT 
acting jointly. Although technically not an organization, the CON-
10, See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-II, T.I.A.S. No. 
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAlT). 
14. SeeJoHN H.JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 32 (2d ed. 1997) (describing 
the ITO as the "missing leg" of the Bretton Woods "stool"). 
15. Id. at 38; see Havana Charter for an International Trade Organiz.ation, U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade & Development, Final Act and Related Documents, art. 46.1, U.N. Doc. E/ 
Conf. 2/78 (1948). 
16. GAlT, supra note 13, at 308. 
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TRACTING PARTIES had the power to make decisions by majority 
voteP In practice, however, a decided preference for decision by 
consensus developed. IS This preference for consensus played a 
particularly important role in GATT dispute settlement. The 
GATT included rather skeletal provisions addressing dispute settle-
ment. Article XXXIII provided simply that any Member State that 
believed another State's conduct violated the GATT's provisions 
could "make written representations or proposals to the other con-
tracting party or parties ... concerned," and the other party or 
parties were to "give sympathetic consideration to the representa-
tions or proposals made to it."19 If the matter was not resolved 
through this mechanism within a reasonable time, it could then be 
referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which were instructed 
to "promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and .. . 
make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties .. . 
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate."20 If 
they considered the circumstances "serious enough to justify such 
action, they could authorize a contracting party to suspend the 
application to any other contracting party or parties of such obliga-
tions or concessions under this Agreement as they determine to be 
appropriate in the circumstances."21 The party whose concessions 
had been suspended would then be "free [to] ... withdraw from 
th[e] Agreement."22 
Although not expressly authorized by the agreement, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES developed the practice of referring disputes 
that had been referred to them under Article XXIII to an arbitral 
panel: 
At the beginning of GATT's history, disputes were generally 
taken up by the plenary semiannual meeting of the contracting 
parties. Later they would be brought to an "intercessional com-
mittee" of the CPs, and even later [they] were delegated to a 
working party set up to examine either all disputes or only par-
ticular disputes brought to GATT. Around 1955 a major shift in 
the procedure occurred . . . . It Wal) decided that rather than 
using a working party composed of nations ... , a dispute would 
be referred to a panel of experts. The three or five experts 
17. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 63. 
18. Id. at 65. 
19. GAIT, supra note 13, at 266. This procedure was also contemplated for claims by a 
party where "any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being 
nullified or impaired or [where] ... the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is 
being impeded." Id. 
20. Id. at 268. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
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would be specifically named and were to act in their own capaci-
ties and not as representatives of any governinent.23 
591 
Because the panels were the delegates of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, which alone had the power to make decisions under 
Article XXIII, panel decisions had no legal force unless adopted by 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Adoption of a panel report effec-
tively required a unanimous agreement of the States-Parties, and 
the losing party could always decline to agree to adoption of the 
report. Perhaps surprisingly, the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
adopted numerous panel reports,24 and satisfaction of complaints 
under the GATT was regarded as quite good.25 Nevertheless, the 
requirement of consensus was regarded as a serious deficiency of 
the pre-WTO dispute settlement system. 
Among the most significant achievements of the Uruguay Round 
agreements was the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),26 
which formalized and refined the process of initiating complaints 
before panels. The DSU declared the dispute settlement system to 
be "a central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system, ... to preserve the rights and obliga-
tions of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the 
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with custom-
ary rules of interpretation of public international law."27 Consid-
ered by some to be the "linchpin of the whole trading system,"28 
the DSU is widely credited (or blamed) for "legalizing" the GATT, 
just as Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison is 
said to have transformed the U.S. Constitution into a truly legal 
document.29 
The DSU creates a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) with the 
power to "establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body 
reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and 
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and 
23. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 115-16. 
24. One hundred one reports were adopted. Seehttp://www.wto.org/english/tratop_ 
e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). 
25. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 285-87 (1993) (cal-
culating that complaining party received full or partial satisfaction of complaints in ninety 
percent of dispute settlement cases brought under GATT 1947), cited injoHN H.jACKSON, 
WILLIAM J. DAVEY, & ALAN O. SYKES, jR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 339 (3d ed. 1995). 
26. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The 
Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993,33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU). 
27. [d. art. 3.2. 
28. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 124. 
29. See SYLVIA SNOWISS,jUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1990). 
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other obligations under the covered agreements."30 If a dispute is 
not resolved through consultations and good offices, conciliation, 
and mediation, the DSB is required to establish a dispute settle-
ment panel to adjudicate the dispute upon the request of the com-
plaining party.31 The panel must "make an objective assessment of 
the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts 
of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the rele-
vant covered agreements."32 Most importantly, the DSU provides 
that the panel's final report must be adopted by the DSB, unless 
within sixty days of the report's circulation to members, a party 
notifies the DSB that it intends to appeal or the DSB by consensus 
decides not to adopt the report.33 Such consensus can be blocked 
by any Member State, including Member States that prevailed 
before the DSB. Adoption of the report is thus, for all practical 
purposes, automatic. 
The DSU also establishes a standing Appellate Body (AB). The 
AB is composed of seven persons who sit in divisions of three.34 
Members of the AB serve four-year terms and may be reappointed 
once.35 According to the DSU, those serving on the AB must be 
"persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in 
law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered 
agreements generally."36 Only "issues of law covered in the panel 
report and legal interpretations developed by the panel" may be 
appealed.37 The AB must address all of the legal issues raised by 
the parties,38 and it may "uphold, modify or reverse the legal find-
ings and conclusions of the panel."39 The AB report is automati-
cally adopted by the DSB unless the DSB by consensus decides 
otherwise within thirty days of the report's circulation.40 
The DSU also provides for monitoring of the parties' compli-
ance with the recommendations of the panels and the AB. Member 
States whose measures have been found to be inconsistent with a 
covered agreement are given a "reasonable period of time" to 
30. DSU, supra note 26, art. 2.1 
31. Id. art. 6.1. 
32. Id. art. 11. 
33. Id. art. 16.4. 
34. Id. art. 17.1. 
35. Id. art. 17.2. Initially, three of the seven were selected by lot to serve a two-year 
tenn, so that turnovers of the Body would be staggered. Id. 
36. Id. art. 17.3. 
37. Id. art. 17.6. 
38. Id. art. 17.12. 
39. Id. art. 17.13. 
40. Id. art. 17.14. 
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bring their measures into compliance.41 In the event of a disagree-
ment about whether a Member State's efforts to comply with the 
decision are adequate, the dispute is to be decided by a panel 
(known as an Article 21.5 panel), which is to have the same compo-
sition as the original panel whenever possible.42 
Although the DSU expresses an affirmative preference for com-
pliance with DSU rulings and recommendations, it also delineates 
procedures for compensation or the suspension of concessions in 
the event of non-compliance.43 If a measure has been found 
inconsistent with a covered agreement, and the member fails to 
bring the measure into conformity with the agreement within the 
determined reasonable period of time, then the member must, if 
requested, enter into negotiations with the prevailing parties "with 
a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation."44 The 
remedy of compensation is available only with the consent of the 
parties concerned.45 If no agreement is reached on compensation, 
then the prevailing party may seek authorization from the DSB to 
suspend trade concessions that it would otherwise be obligated to 
grant the non-complying Member-State.46 The DSU provides that 
the level of authorized suspended concessions "shall be equivalent 
to the level of nullification or impairment."47 It also specifies that 
both compensation and suspension of concessions are temporary 
measures available only pending full compliance by the member 
concerned with the recommendations of the DSB.48 
With the exception of a few regional systems, the WTO's dispute 
settlement system is in several respects far better developed and 
more intrusive than other international dispute settlement 
regimes. Dispute settlement panels have compulsory jurisdiction 
41. Id. art. 21.3. 
42. Id. art. 21.5. 
43. Id. art 22.1. 
44. Id. art. 22.2. "Compensation" in this context has a different meaning than in inter-
national law generally. While "compensation" is ordinarily thought of as a retrospective 
remedy designed to compensate for past harm, in the wro, the term refers to a purely 
forward-looking remedy: the granting of a trade benefit to the prevailing party in order to 
compensate prospectively for the nullification or impairment caused by the nonconform-
ing measure. See, e.g., Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascen-
dancy of Antidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 49, 71 (1997) (describing 
compensation as prospective relief in the wrO). 
45. DSU, supra note 26, art. 22.2. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. art. 22.4. Again, this remedy is purely prospective; it does not compensate for 
losses already suffered, but rather "rebalances the playing field" for the future. See Corr, 
supra note 44, at 71. 
48. DSU, supra note 26, art. 22.1. 
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over all disputes between Member States involving covered agree-
ments. The procedures set up under the DSU are considerably 
more detailed than those that exist in most other international 
adjudicatory regimes. Very few other international dispute settle-
ment regimes include a standing appellate tribunal to review all 
issues of law decided by first-level panels. Still fewer regimes estab-
lish a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the decisions of 
panels. 
III. THREE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES (AND ONE NON-
DIFFE~NCE) BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND IN THE WTO 
A. The Addressees of the System's Norms 
Despite having a highly developed dispute settlement system, the 
WTO remains a treaty-based international organization, in many 
respects like the United States under the Articles of Confederation. 
The obligations imposed by the agreements enforced by the WTO 
panels and the AB operate on the member states as political bod-
ies, not directly on the individuals in the states. Under the DSU, 
claims are brought by member states against other member states. 
By contrast, in the United States, adjudication occurs largely in 
suits between individuals. Even when the validity of an act of a 
state or federal government is at issue, the challenge often arises in 
the context of a suit between private individuals.49 Even in direct 
challenges to official acts or omissions, the defendant is typically a 
state or federal official rather than the state itself. 50 
The framers believed that giving the federal government the 
power to legislate directly on individuals was essential to giving effi-
cacy to the directives of the federal government. They appear to 
have believed that norms addressed to states as political bodies had 
to rely on good faith for their efficacy or else they could only be 
enforced through military force. The former option had been 
shown to be ineffective, and the latter was undesirable for the same 
reason that war is generally regarded as undesirable: it harms the 
innocent as well as the guilty. While judicial enforcement of the 
law was preferable, the framers appear to have believed that judi-
cial enforcement was available only against individuals. Their views 
49. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (suit between 
private parties concerning title to land which raised the question of the validity of both a 
state law and a federal law). 
50. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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in this regard may have stemmed from the lack of precedents for 
international adjudicatory tribunals. 
B. The Forms of Review 
Unlike the United States under the Articles, and like the United 
States under the Constitution, the WTO has a judicial branch 
empowered to resolve disputes arising under the system's legal 
rules.51 The 'Judicial review" exercised by the panels and AB, how-
ever, only corresponds to the least controversial type of U.S. judi-
cial review. 
The U.S. Constitution divides power between a federal govern-
ment and the governments of the several states. It also divides the 
powers of the federal government among three branches: the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial branches. The least controversial 
form of judicial review in which the U.S. courts engage is review of 
the acts of the states-legislative, executive, and judicial-for con-
formity with federal law. Article VI of the Constitution provides 
that: 
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 52 
This provision is regarded as express authority for judicial review of 
state acts for conformity with federal law. Even scholars who claim 
that other forms of judicial review were not contemplated by the 
framers or authorized in the constitutional text concede that the 
framers contemplated judicial review of the validity of the acts of 
the states. 53 This Article refers to this form of judicial review as 
"vertical" review because the organ of a hierarchically superior gov-
ernment is reviewing the acts of a subordinate government for con-
formity with the laws of the higher entity. 
A slightly more controversial form of judicial review, at least ini-
tially, was the power of the courts to invalidate the acts of federal 
executive officials that violate federal law. When Marbury v. 
51. Although the DSU does not denominate the dispute settlement panels or the AB 
"courts" or "judicial" bodies, they clearly function as the WTO's judiciary. See Steve 
Charnovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANI. 
ZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 219, 223-24 (2002). 
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
53. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 fuRV. 
L. REv. 4, 60-61 (2001). 
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Madison was rendered, its more controversial holding was to affirm 
the power of the courts to entertain a mandamus action against a 
federal officia1.54 Today, however, this power is well-settled and 
widely accepted. This Article refers to this form of judicial review 
as "horizontal" because the courts are reviewing the acts of a coor-
dinate branch of the same government to determine their con-
formity with the laws of that government. 
Another form of horizontal judicial review is the most controver-
sial: judicial review of the acts of the federal legislative branch for 
conformity with the Constitution. The textual support for this 
form of judicial review is less direct than for vertical review, and 
some scholars maintain that this form of review was an innovation 
of Chief justice Marshall not authorized by the Constitution.55 
This Article does not examine that claim. Despite the scholarly 
objections, even this form of judicial review is well entrenched in 
the United States and is unlikely to be abandoned any time soon. 
judicial review in the WTO is almost exclusively vertical judicial 
review. The purpose of the dispute settlement system, according to 
the DSU, is to resolve cases "in which a Member considers that any 
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered 
agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another 
Member."56 judicial review in the WTO thus consists of the 
enforcement of superior norms by the organ charged with adminis-
tering them (the WTO, which sits in a position analogous to that of 
the federal government in the United States), against the entities 
subject to those norms (the Member States, which in this respect 
are in a position analogous to that of the U.S. states). 
Horizontal review is largely unknown in the WTO system. It is 
difficult to conceive how such review might develop. The most 
controversial form of such review-review of the legislative acts of a 
coordinate branch-is possible only if the legal system includes a 
legislative power and if that power is subject to limits. Limits can 
be of either a substantive or procedural nature. Procedural limits 
are the rules specifying the number and distribution of votes neces-
sary to pass an act of legislation. Substantive limits are those that 
54. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174-76; see Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: 
Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1612, 1630 n.102 (1997) ("Marbury . .. was 
most controversial ... for its assertion that the Court could issue an order to a cabinet 
official acting under presidential instructions."); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT 
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 232, 245-46, 248-49 (1922). 
55. See Kramer, supra note 53; SNOWISS, supra note 29. 
56. DSU, supra note 26, art. 3.5. 
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render particular acts of legislation invalid because of their 
content. 
The WTO allocates what might be regarded as legislative powers 
to certain bodies. First, it specifies how trade agreements can be 
amended. Different supermajorities are required depending on 
which provision is sought to be amended. For example, an amend-
ment of Article I or II of GAIT 1994 requires the agreement of all 
Member States.57 Otherprovisions, apparently including the provi-
sion specifying the requirements for amendment, may be amended 
by a two-thirds vote, and such amendments would be binding on 
the states that have accepted them.58 It is possible that a dispute 
could arise as to whether an attempted amendment properly 
required a unanimous agreement of the Member States or merely 
a two-thirds vote. If such an issue were to arise in the context of a 
dispute between two Member States, the panel, and later the AB, 
would have to decide whether they have the power to review the 
decisions of the other pertinent organs of the WTO on that ques-
tion. They may very well decide that they must defer to the other 
organs' decision. In the United States, questions relating to the 
amendment process are generally considered nonjusticiable.59 In 
any event, this sort of judicial review, if it occurred at all, would be 
quite narrow, although potentially important. 
The Ministerial Conference and the General Council hold a 
quasi-legislative power "to adopt interpretations of this Agreement 
and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements."6o Such interpretations 
require a "three-fourths majority of the [m]embers."61 This power 
IS also apparently subject to a substantive limit, as the provision 
57. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, art. X, 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND vol. 1, 33 l.L.M. 13, 20 (1994). 
58. The Ministerial Conference, however, "may decide by a three-fourths majority of 
the Members that any amendment made effective under the preceding provision is of such 
a nature that any Member which has not accepted it within a period specified by the Minis-
terial Conference in each case shall be free to withdraw from the WTO or to remain a 
Member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference." Id. art. X, para. 5. With respect to 
some such amendments, a two-thirds vote suffices only if the amendment is "of a nature 
that would not alter the rights and obligations of the Members." Id. art. X, para. 4. 
59. See Coleman v: Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (holding that only Congress-not the 
courts-may decide questions of how long a proposed amendment to the Constitution can 
remain open to ratification). The U.S. courts also decline to review questions about 
whether a statute duly proclaimed actually received the number of votes required by the 
Constitution. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 409 (1990) (Scalia, j., 
dissenting) . 
60. \VTO Agreement, supra note 57, art. IX, c1.2. 
61. Id. 
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according the power specifies that it "shall not be used in a manner 
that would undermine the amendment provisions in Article X."62 
The agreement thus contemplates a distinction between "interpre-
tations" and "amendments," which presumably corresponds to the 
distinction between explicating existing obligations and establish-
ing new ones. 
Although disputes could occur about whether an "interpreta-
tion" duly propounded by the Ministerial Conference or the Gen-
eral Council crossed the line between interpretation and 
amendment, the issue would likely be regarded as nonjusticiable. 
The line between law-interpreting and law-making is a notoriously 
difficult one to draw. The requirement of a three-fourths majority 
for such determinations would likely be regarded as an adequate 
safeguard against abuse of this power. For this reason, it is likely 
that neither the panels nor the AB would regard it as within its 
power to review whether a duly certified interpretation exceeds the 
bounds of in terpretation. 63 
In short, there are very few situations in which a quasi-legislative 
power is granted to any organ of the WTO subject to substantive 
limits. There are accordingly very few possible occasions for the 
panels or the AB even potentially to engage in what in the United 
States is regarded as the most controversial type of horizontal judi-
cial review: review of legislative acts for conformity with the sub-
stantive limits imposed by the constitutive instrument. 
On the other hand, it is possible that a form of judicial review 
may arise in the WTO context that does not exist in the United 
62. Id. A similar quasi-legislative power subject to substantive limitations is the power 
of the Ministerial Conference, by three-fourths vote, to waive an obligation imposed on a 
Member State by the wro agreements "in exceptional circumstances." Id. art. IX.3. A 
dispute between Member States could thus raise the question whether "exceptional cir-
cumstances" justified a waiver granted to one of the States. 
63. On the other hand, when a similar argument was made in the famous U.S. case 
Bush v. Gore, five justices apparently found it justiciable. In a concurring opinion joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Florida Supreme 
Court's requirement that the improperly-marked ballots be counted "significantly 
departed from the statutory framework" put in place by the Florida legislature-a departure 
that crossed the line between interpreting and making law. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-
22 (2000) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). Justice Stevens, however, rioted that the Supreme 
Court did not make any substantive changes to Florida law; it simply "did what courts 
do"-i.e., stated what the law is. Id. at 128 (Stevens, j., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803».Justice Souter agreed. See id. at 133 (Souter, 
j., dissenting) ("[TJhe interpretations by the Florida court raise no substantial question 
under Article II."). These five justices thus apparently regarded the distinction between 
law-interpretation and law-amendment to be justiciable. None of the other Justices 
addressed the issue. 
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States: review of legislation for conformity with external norms lim-
iting the legislative power, norms having their source outside the 
constitutive instruments of the WTO. The instruments establishing 
the WTO and imposing obligations on the Member States are trea-
ties. General international law imposes certain substantive limita-
tions on what States may agree to by treaty. Specifically, there are 
certain norms of international law that have the status of jus cogens. 
Although there is much debate about which norms fit into this cat-
egory, there is wide agreement that States may not contract out of 
such norms through treaties.64 In other words, a treaty provision 
that conflicts with a jus cogens norm is invalid. A dispute before a 
WTO panel or the AB could thus raise the question whether a pro-
vision of the WTO agreements is invalid because it conflicts with a 
jus cogens norm.65 
Whether such an issue would be cognizable before a panel or 
the AB is the subject of some uncertainty. Some scholars take the 
position that the panels, and the AB, can and must decide whether 
a treaty obligation is invalid because it violates a jus cogens norm.66 
Other scholars, however, maintain that the duty of WTO panels 
and the AB is to adjudicate disputes under the provisions of the 
covered agreements and not to enforce norms outside the WTO 
system.67 The latter position is closer to how the U.S. courts 
approach the analogous issue. The United States, as a sovereign 
State, is subject to obligations imposed by international law, includ-
ing the WTO agreements. The domestic courts, however, are not 
empowered to invalidate laws passed by the legislature on the 
ground that they violate international law. The courts will seek to 
avoid conflicts with international law by interpreting statutes to be 
consistent with such law if at all possible.68 If a conflict is unavoida-
ble, however, the courts will enforce the statute passed by the legis-
64. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 
V.N.T.S. 332, 344. 
65. General international law also specifies that a later treaty supersedes an earlier 
one between the same parties. See id. art. 30. If two Member States enter into a later treaty 
that is inconsistent with a WTO provision, the later treaty would supersede the WTO provi-
sion under general rules of international law. Whether WTO panels and the AB may 
decline to enforce such WTO provisions under such circumstances is also a matter of 
debate. Compare Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. 
INT'L L. 753, 753 (2002) (concluding that they may not), with Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of 
Public International Law in the WTO, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 553 (2001) (concluding that they 
may). 
66. See Marceau, supra note 65. 
67. Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Settlement, 40 fuRY. INT'L LJ. 333 
(1999). 
68. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 V.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
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lature, even if it conflicts with the United States' obligations under 
international law.69 
The question whether WTO panels or the AB have the power to 
decline to enforce WTO provisions that conflict with jus cog ens 
norms may be largely academic, however, as conflicts between a 
WTO provision and a jus cogens norm will be rare. Commentators 
have suggested that there is a conflict between the GATT provi-
sions requiring member states to allow imports of products made 
with indentured child labor and the jus cogens norm prohibiting 
indentured child labor.70 The existence of this conflict, however, is 
highly debatable. First, it is not altogether clear that the WTO 
agreements disable States from prohibiting the importation of 
products made with indentured child labor.71 Even if they do, 
such a disability may not conflict with any jus cog ens norm. 
Although there does exist a jus cogens norm prohibiting indentured 
child labor, it is not clear that there is a norm in international law 
requiring States to prohibit the importation of products made with 
indentured child labor. Even if there were a norm requiring the 
prohibition of such importation, it is far from clear that that norm 
has the status of jus cogens. In the absence of a jus cog ens norm 
requiring States to prohibit the importation of products made with 
indentured child labor, there would not be a conflict that would 
invalidate the (assumed) WTO norm prohibiting members from 
barring the importation of such goods.72 
In short, the opportunities for WTO panels and the AB to 
engage in judicial review of WTO legislative action seem to be few 
and far between, and, if the opportunities present themselves, it is 
likely that the panels and the AB would decline to exercise such 
reVIew. 
Nor does there appear to be much room in the WTO for judicial 
review of executive action. The WTO's executive arm-the Secre-
tariat-has functions of a bureaucratic nature. It is difficult to 
imagine an exercise of power by the Secretariat that could affect a 
69. See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
70. Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the 
Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663 (1997). 
7l. This Article's author and others have discussed some arguments for concluding 
that such an import prohibition falls within one or more of the exceptions found in the 
GATT. See Carlos M. Vazquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights-Past, Present and Future, 6 J. 
hn'L ECON. L. 797 (2003); Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International 
Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 133 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Moral 
Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA.J. INT'L L. 689 (1998). 
72. For further discussion, see Vazquez, supra note 7l. 
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Member State's rights under the covered agreements in such a way 
as to create a dispute between Member States before a WTO panel. 
The closest a panel has come to confronting a "separation of pow-
ers" question was in "India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports 
of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products."73 This dispute 
presented the question whether the panel had competence to 
review a Member State's justification for a restrictive import mea-
sure taken for balance-of-payments purposes in the light of the 
competence given to the Committee on Balance of Payments 
Restrictions (Committee) by the Balance of Payments Understand-
ing74 to conduct consultations on such matters. The panel decided 
that the power given to the Committee did not deprive it of compe-
tence in such matters, and the AB agreed. This conclusion was not 
surprising given the footnote in the Balance of Payments Under-
standing specifically providing that "[t]he provisions of Arti-
cles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with 
respect to any matters arising from the application of restrictive 
import measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes."75 
Thus, judicial review in the WTO differs from judicial review in 
the United States in that it is mostly, perhaps entirely, vertical in 
nature. The failure to notice this difference has led to the adop-
tion of provisions in WTO agreements based on a flawed analogy 
between judicial review in the WTO and in the United States. The 
Anti-Dumping Agreement76 contains a standard-of-review provision 
that transplants to WTO dispute settlement a doctrine developed 
in the United States in the context of judicial review of administra-
tive interpretations of certain statutes. Under the so-called Chevron 
doctrine,77 U.S. courts will defer to an administrative agency's 
73. WTO Appellate Body, India - Quantitative Restrictions On Imparts Of Agricultural, 
Textile and Industrial Products, Aug. 23, 1999, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 
1999), available at http://docsonline.wto.org. 
74. Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 57, Annex lA, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/09-bops.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004) [here-
inafter Balance-of-Payments Understanding]. 
75. Id. at 29 n.!. 
76. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 57, Annex lA, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf (last visited Apr: 8, 2004) [here-
inafter Anti-Dumping Agreement]; RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw HANDBOOK 392 
(2d ed. 2001). 
77. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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interpretation of a statute that it is responsible for administering.78 
If a statute is unambiguous, the courts will strike down conflicting 
administrative interpretations. If, after using the "traditional tools 
of statutory construction,"79 the court concludes that the statute is 
silent or ambiguous on a given point, the court will uphold the 
agency's interpretation of the statute as long as it is reasonable.80 
The Chevron doctrine was apparently used as a model for Article 
17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.81 Article 17.6 provides that, 
in examining certain anti-dumping matters: 
the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agree-
ment in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant 
provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissi-
ble interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure 
to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of 
those permissible interpretations.82 
The standard of review set forth in this provision differs from the 
Chevron doctrine in at least two obvious ways. First, rather than 
requiring the panel to employ "traditional tools of statutory con-
struction" to determine if the provision is ambiguous, it directs the 
panel to apply "customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tionallaw." This was a meant as a reference to Articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.83 Second, the pro-
vision requires deference if the authorities' interpretation is "per-
missible," a seemingly less deferential standard than Chevron, which 
calls for deference to "reasonable" agency interpretations. Both 
78. Id. at 844-45; see also Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, 
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 199 (1996). 
79. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
80. Id. at 843. 
8l. See Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO 
Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 109, 117 (2002); Steven 
P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Panel Deference to National Government Decisions: 
The Misplaced Analogy to the U.S. Chevron Standard-of Review Doctrine, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAw AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 187, 194 (E.U. Petersmann ed., 
1997). Croley and Jackson provide somewhat different reasons for regarding the analogy to 
the Chevron doctrine to be inapt. 
82. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 76, art. 17.6(ii). 
83. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 81, at 195-96. Article 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, headed "General Rule of Interpretation," provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Article 32 provides for "supple-
mentary means of interpretation ... in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according 
to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Apr. 24, 
1970, arts. 31-32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 1155 V.N.T.S. 18,232. 
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aspects of the provision were the result of a compromise between 
proponents and opponents of adopting Chevron deference in this 
context. According to some commentators, the first sentence of 
Article 17.6 renders the second sentence moot, as international 
rules of interpretation will always yield only one permissible inter-
pretation.84 Others disagree.85 The AB treatment of Article 17.6 
thus far suggests that the attempt to import Chevron deference into 
WTO adjudication has not been entirely successful, as the AB has 
resisted the standard.86 
Deference to Member State authorities in the context of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement mayor may not be wise. The analogy to 
Chevron deference, however, is decidedly inapt. Chevron deference 
takes place in the context of horizontal judicial review, whereas 
WTO adjudication is vertical judicial review. If Article 17.6 
required deference to Member State authorities, it would be analcr 
gous to a requirement that federal courts defer to state court inter-
pretations of federal law. There is no such deference in the United 
States. 
Deference in the context of horizontal judicial review differs 
from deference in the context of vertical judicial review in three 
important ways. First, when a U.S. court defers to the administra-
tive agency charged with the enforcement of a given law, it is defer-
ring to a single entity. Accordingly, there will be a single 
interpretation of the law throughout the legal system, albeit one 
rendered by an agency rather than a court. When a WTO panel or 
the AB defers to the interpretations of the Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment by the Member States, it is deferring to 135 potentially differ-
ent interpretations of the same instrument. Deference in the 
vertical context thus produces the possibility of a multiplicity of 
interpretations. 
Second, when a U.S. court defers to an administrative agency's 
interpretation of a statute, it is deferring to the judgment of a 
branch of the same government that enacted the law. The effec-
tive interpretation is one that is rendered by an agency that repre-
sents the interests of all the states. By contrast, when a WTO panel 
or the AB defers to a Member State's interpretation of a WTO 
agreement, an agreement that binds all Member States is being 
construed by an entity that represents only one Member State. As 
Chief Justice Marshall said in another of his famous opinions: 
84. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 81, at 197. 
85. See Tarullo, supra note 81, at 150-52. 
86. See id. 
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Would the people of anyone state trust those of another with a 
power to control the most insignificant operations of their state 
government? We know they would not. Why, then, should we 
suppose that the people of anyone state would be willing to 
trust those of another with a power to control the operations of 
a government to which they have confided their most important 
and most valuable interests? The ... Union alone, therefore, 
can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling mea-
sures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be 
abused.87 
Similar reasons call into question the wisdom of leaving the inter-
pretation of a WTO provision to one Member State. 
Third, when a U.S. court defers to an administrative agency 
charged with administering a statute, it defers to a coordinate 
branch that is acting as a regulator. The agency's role is to enforce 
the statute against the regulated parties. By contrast, when a WTO 
panel or the AB defers to a Member State's construction of a WTO 
agreement provision, it is deferring to the interpretation placed 
upon the treaty by the regulated party. For the AB to defer to a Mem-
ber State's interpretation of a WTO agreement would be like a U.S. 
court deferring to a state's construction of the takings clause or a 
private party's construction of the securities laws. Such deference 
is not irrational, but it is not Chevron deference. Mandating defer-
ence to the construction placed on a law by the regulated party is 
the same as calling for the weakest reasonable interpretation.88 By 
contrast, when a U.S. court defers to a U.S. agency's interpretation 
of a statute, it may be deferring to an interpretation that is more 
stringent than the one that the court would have given the statute. 
The foregoing analysis does not mean that the deference con-
templated by Article 17.6 is necessarily undesirable or that Article 
17.6 should be disregarded by dispute settlement panels or the 
AB.89 The point is simply that, to the extent that Article 17.6 was 
modeled on the Chevron doctrine, it was based on an inapt analogy. 
Deference under Article 17.6 is more like the rule of lenity, under 
which the interpretation favoring the regulated party is pre-
ferred,gO or "the customary international law interpretive principle 
87. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,431 (1819). 
88. This insight alleviates somewhat the first objection discussed above. Although Arti-
cle 17.6 would appear to require the AB to defer to numerous disparate interpretations of 
the same provision, the effective interpretation would be the weakest permissible one. 
89. Cf Tarullo, supra note 81, at 153 (arguing persuasively that the AB has read Arti-
cle 17.6 out of the Anti-Dumping Agreement). 
90. "[Almbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in 
favor of lenity." Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971). The rule initially devel-
oped in response to conditions in nineteenth-century England, where many crimes were 
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of in dubio mitius [which] holds that, where a treaty provision is 
ambiguous, 'that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous 
to the party assuming the obligation.' "91 Chevron deference oper-
ates in a different context and has a different effect. 
C. A Non-Difference: The "Binding" Nature of the Decisions 
Before turning to the third major structural difference between 
dispute settlement in the WTO and in the United States, this Arti-
cle addresses a feature of WTO dispute settlement that some com-
mentators claim distinguishes WTO panel and AB decisions from 
the decisions of U.S. courts and other international organizations. 
Closer analysis reveals that the distinction has been overstated. 
Under the DSU, when a panel determines that a Member State's 
measures do not conform with the covered agreements, it is 
required to "recommend that the Member concerned bring the 
measure into conformity with that agreement."92 The DSU pro-
vides that, if the losing party does not conform its measures to its 
obligations under the covered agreements (as interpreted by the 
panel or AB decision), and if the parties do not agree on mutually 
satisfactory compensation, the prevailing party may request author-
ization to suspend concessions toward the losing party.93 In the 
parlance of international law, it may seek authority to take counter-
measures. An Article 21.5 panel94 may approve suspension of con-
cessions in an amount "equivalent to the level of the nullification 
or impairment" of the prevailing party's rights under the covered 
agreements resulting from the losing party's breach.95 
In the light of these provisions, some scholars have taken the 
position that the losing party in a WTO case has the legal option to 
bring its nonconforming measure into compliance with the 
requirements of the covered agreements, as interpreted by the 
panel and AB, or instead to suffer a suspension of concessions by 
punishable by death. Courts often went to great lengths to discover statutory ambiguities 
that could be construed strictly in order to "relieve a defendant of the death penalty." 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 2.2(d) n.25 (1986). The modern view is 
that criminals (i.e., those to whom the law is addressed) should be given fair warning 
regarding prohibited behavior and severity of punishment. Id. § 2.2(d). 
91. Tarullo, supra note 81, at 152 (quoting 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 1278 
(Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 1992». 
92. DSU, supra note 26, art. 19.1. 
93. Id. art. 22.2. 
94. Id. art. 21.5. 
95. Id. art. 22.4. 
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the prevailing party.96 The claim, in other words, is that there is no 
legal obligation to bring measures into conformity, and that the 
losing party may legally accept the sanctions if that would be eco-
nomically more efficient.97 If so, then the decisions of the panels 
and AB would differ significantly in their legal effect from the deci-
sions of U.S. courts, and indeed of most, if not all, courts. The 
decisions of U.S. courts are, of course, considered legally binding 
on the parties, as are the decisions of international tribunals. The 
Charter of the United Nations states specifically that a Member 
State has a legal obligation to "comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party."9S 
The claim that the WTO agreements provide the losing party 
with this legal option, however, is mistaken.99 As noted above, the 
DSU expressly provides that: 
Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obli-
gations are temporary measures available in the event that the 
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a 
reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor 
the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred 
to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure 
into conformity with the covered agreements. lOO 
Although the DSU describes the panel's judgment as a "recom-
mendation" that measures be brought into conformity with the 
covered agreements,lOl the term appears to be a euphemism for 
"order." 
The provisions specifying the prevailing party's option to sus-
pend concessions are not inconsistent with the existence of a legal 
obligation of the losing party to comply with the "recommenda-
tions" of the panel or AB. The provisions concerning suspension 
of concessions merely set forth the manner in which the prevailing 
party may seek to enforce its right to full compliance by the losing 
party in the event compliance is not forthcoming. These are, in 
fact, quite similar to the options generally available to prevailing 
parties under international law for responding to the losing party's 
96. Judith Hippler Bello, The wro Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 91 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996). 
97. Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and 
Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 190-91 (2002). 
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1. 
99. See John H. Jackson, The wro Dispute Understanding-Misunderstandings on the 
Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1997); Carlos M. Vazquez & John H. 
Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance with the wro Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAw & 
POL'y INT'L Bus. 555 (2002). 
100. DSU, supra note 26, art. 22.1. 
101. Id. art. 19.1. 
HeinOnline -- 36 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 607 2004
2004] Judicial Review in the United States and the wro 607 
breach of its international obligation to comply with judgments 
rendered against it by international tribunals.102 Under general 
international law, such measures concern the "implementation" of 
another State's international responsibility.103 They do not negate 
the existence of the obligation to comply or suggest that, as a legal 
matter, a State is free to decline to comply and suffer the conse-
quences, any more than a person is legally free to persist in an 
unlawful activity as long as she is willing to suffer the legal 
punishment. 
Internationaljudicial tribunals typically rely on countermeasures 
to give efficacy to their judgments because, unlike national legal 
systems, they lack an executive branch with control over an armed 
force that can require compliance with the judgments on pain of 
incarceration. (The International Court of Justice is an exception, 
in that its judgments are potentially backed by the force of the 
United Nations Security Council, which may authorize "mea-
sures."104) That the judgments ofWTO panels and the AB are not 
enforceable by force by an executive branch is the third major 
structural difference between WTO dispute settlement system and 
judicial review in the United States. 
D. Enforcement of the Decisions 
Although there is a legal obligation to comply with the "recom-
mendations" of WTO panels upheld by the AB, there is no execu-
tive branch in the WTO with the power to employ force to enforce 
that obligation against recalcitrant states. At first blush, this seems 
to be a major difference between WTO dispute settlement and 
judicial review in the United States. On closer inspection, however, 
the difference is not as great as it first appears. 
To be sure, vertical judicial review in the WTO differs signifi-
cantly from vertical judicial review in the United States. When the 
Supreme Court renders a judgment that a state is legally required 
to do something (or to refrain from doing something), the state's 
obligation to comply with the judgment is enforceable by force. 
While the judicial branch does not control a military force that can 
102. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, arts. 49-53 (2001), at http://www.un.org/ 
law /ile/ texts/StateJesponsibility / responsibility_articles (e). pdf. 
103. See id. pt. III. 
104. The U.N. Charter provides that, "[iJf any party to a case fails to perform the obli-
gations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may 
have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommen-
dations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." U.N. CHAR. 
TER art. 94, para. 2. 
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enforce its decisions, the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment controls such a force and is obligated to "take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed."105 The judiciary's dependence on 
another branch to enforce its decisions poses the risk that its judg-
ments against the 'states will go unenforced, and indeed there have 
been episodes in our history in which such judgments have gone 
unenforced. President Jackson is reputed to have stated, in 
response to the Supreme Court's judgment against Georgia in 
Worcester v. Georgia, I 06 'John Marshall has made his judgmen t, now 
let him enforce it."J07 Similarly, enforcement of the judgments of 
the International Court of Justice depends on the willingness of 
the Security Council to take enforcement measures, which at least 
in the case of the five permanent members is very unlikely. lOS The 
grant of a power in a coordinate branch to enforce ajudicialjudg-
ment is no guarantee that judicial judgments will be satisfied. Nev-
ertheless, in the United States the power does exist, and for many 
years the executive branch has faithfully executed even unpopular 
judicial judgments against the states, such as those of the U.S. 
Supreme Court mandating desegregation in the South. IOg The 
existence of this power is a significant difference between vertical 
judicial review in the WTO and in the United States. 
Not all U.s. judicial review, however, is effectively backed by 
force. The pertinent comparison is between vertical judicial review 
in the WTO and horizontal judicial review in the United States. 
When the courts strike down a statute enacted by the legislature, 
the judgment is enforceable by force by the executive branch. 
Because both the executive and the legislative branches are 
majoritarian branches, and both are involved in the legislative pro-
cess and likely approved the law, it is likely that the executive will 
disagree with a court judgment striking down the law. Relying on 
the executive branch to enforce such judgments thus seems prob-
lematic. The problem is even more acute when the judgment is 
against the executive branch. Is a judgment against the executive 
branch that depends for its efficacy on the willingness of that 
branch to enforce it truly backed by force? 
Consider two episodes in U.S. history. During the Civil War, 
Chief Justice Taney ordered President Abraham Lincoln to release 
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
106. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
107. See DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARHSALL AND THE GROwrH OF THE REpUBLIC 
365 (1948). 
108. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. 
109. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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from custody John Merryman, whom Taney found was being held 
in violation of the Constitution. 110 President Lincoln had sus-
pended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in response to 
secessionist violence in Maryland: 111 Concluding that the Constitu-
tion grants Congress, not the President, the power to suspend 
habeas corpus in an emergency, Chief Justice Taney issued the 
writ, commanding General George Cadwalader to release Mer-
ryman, and General Cadwalader requested a postponement of the 
order until he could receive further instructions from President 
Lincoln.112 Chief Justice Taney "would have nothing of it," and 
directed that an "attachment be issued against [the General] for 
contempt." 11 3 Chief Justice Taney had his opinion delivered to 
President Lincoln. Lincoln responded in a public speech in which 
he stated that "it was not believed that any law was violated."114 
Although Lincoln did not directly address the question whether a 
president may disregard a judicial order,1I5 he did "suggest" that 
the president may violate a single law in order to preserve the Con-
stitution as a whole. 116 He also pointed out that the situation in 
which he acted was a "dangerous emergency," for which the provi-
sion allowing suspension of the writ of habeas was "plainly made."II7 
He declined to release Merryman. 
During the Watergate crisis, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered 
President Richard Nixon to turn over certain incriminating audi-
otapes.1I8 Despite initial suggestions from President Nixon's law-
yer that he might not comply,1I9 President Nixon complied with 
the order and turned over the incriminating tapes-ultimately at 
the cost of his presidency. He resigned shortly thereafter. 
What do these episodes reveal about the need for an external 
force to compel compliance with judicial judgments? There is no 
doubt that such force is quite important in municipal law to 
110. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
Ill. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Execu-
tive Branchlnterpretation, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 81, 90 (1993). 
112. ld. at 91. 
113. ld. 
114. ld. (citing Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), reprinted 
in 11 COLLECfED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 332 (1953». 
115. Paulsen, supra note 111, at 95. 
116. !d. at 94. 
117. ld. at 95 (citing Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 
1861), reprinted in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 421, 421-40 (1953) (internal 
quotation marks omitted». 
118. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
119. ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 1-8 
(1976). 
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enforce judicial judgments involving private parties. Even persons 
who are generally law-abiding and predisposed to comply with 
judgments against them would likely lose that disposition if they 
discovered that others were getting away with violating judgments. 
The same is true more broadly of compliance with law-that is why 
effective law enforcement is essential to law's efficacy, and hence 
why force is necessary for effective law. In any legal system, how-
ever, ultimate control over an armed force must reside somewhere. 
Whoever possesses control over such force will not be effectively 
subject to such force. Judicial decisions against the possessor of 
that power will not be realistically backed by force. 
Does that mean that judicial judgments against that person or 
persons are meaningless? Far from it. President Nixon ultimately 
complied with the order against him, and other Presidents also 
comply daily with less-notable judicial judgments against them. 
While in some cases such obedience may be a matter of principle, 
in other cases (including President Nixon's) the more likely reason 
for compliance is that the public expects Presidents·to comply and 
they would lose public support by refusing to do so. (The Presi-
dent may also fear impeachment if he fails to comply, but this is a 
realistic prospect only if both houses of the legislature are con-
trolled by the opposite party. In any event, impeachment and con-
viction are likely to occur only if the general public regards the 
failure to comply with the judicial judgment as an offense warrant-
ing impeachment.) The efficacy of judicial judgments against the 
executive branch thus ultimately depends on public support for 
the institution of judicial review. If the President disagrees with a 
Supreme Court judgment and regards the consequences of compli-
ance to be grave enough, even the most virtuous President will 
likely refuse to abide by the judgment, very likely with public sup-
port. The circumstances of Ex parte Merryman were, of course, 
extreme; a civil war was raging and public support for the Court 
was at a low ebb in light of its then-recent decision in Dred Scott.120 
In the end, the efficacy of a judicial judgment against the executive 
branch depends on public support for the norms of the system and 
the courts' role in enforcing them. 
In international systems, control over enforcement power lies at 
the level of the States rather than at the level of the international 
institution. Even in the United Nations, in which the Security 
Council in theory possesses the power to authorize the use of force, 
120. See Merryman, supra note 110; see also Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
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the actual control over the force lies with Member States. The 
organization must rely on its members to provide the force when it 
has been authorized. Moreover, in light of the realities of world 
politics and the existence of the veto power, States will rarely 
authorize such force. States could theoretically create an interna-
tional organization with control over a military force that could 
effectively enforce the judgments of its judicial bodies against the 
States. Such an organization would be similar to the United States' 
federal executive branch, which enforces the U.S. courts' judg-
ments against the states. The States that make up the international 
community, however, especially those that currently control such 
force, are loathe to do so, and that situation is unlikely to change. 
For this reason, international legal systems are unlikely for the 
foreseeable future, or ever, to have judicial bodies whose judg-
ments are backed by force controlled by a coordinate branch. 
Under such circumstances, the efficacy of the judgments of such 
tribunals must be secured by other means. The traditional means 
provided by international law has been enforcement though coun-
termeasures initiated by one or more States. Suspension of conces-
sions is a form of countermeasure. Although the WTO is widely 
regarded as having among the most effective dispute settlement 
systems in international law, it is unlikely that its effectiveness is a 
result of its regime of countermeasures. Indeed, the DSU signifi-
cantly regulates the use of countermeasures, subjecting a prevail-
ing party's ability to use them to limits not found in general 
international law. For example, in general international law an 
injured State has recourse to countermeasures that would compen-
sate it for losses incurred as a result of the breach that provoked 
the countermeasure. 121 Under the DSU, a State may suspend con-
cessions equivalent to the loss it expects to suffer prospectively; 
losses occurring before the judicial decision are not part of the 
calculation. 122 
If the level of countermeasures does not account for the efficacy 
of the WTO's dispute settlement system, then what does? The 
quality of its decisions deserves some of the credit. The most likely 
reason, however, is the same reason the U.S. courts' exercise of 
horizontal judicial review has been effective: the relevant public 
(primarily Member States) support the norms of the system and 
the role of the panels and the AB in maintaining the system. As 
the author of this Article has written elsewhere about Member 
121. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 102, art. 51. 
122. See Vazquez & Jackson, supra note 99. 
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State compliance with the judgments of WTO dispute settlement 
panels: 
The effectiveness of the regime for enforcing international 
trade law may. .. be attributable to the Member states' strong 
desire to maintain the trade system and their recognition that 
the benefits of that system can be achieved only if all of the sys-
tem's rules are generally complied with. Because of the interde-
pendence of the system's rules and the reciprocal nature of the 
duties and benefits, self-interested states rationally subordinate 
the short-term interests that might otheIWise lead them to vio-
late their international trade obligations in order to attain the 
long-term benefits afforded by that system. They fear that a vio-
lation of the rules will not only lead other states to retaliate, but 
could also bring the entire system down. And they are convinced 
that they have more to gain than to lose from the existence of 
the system. This sort of rational self-interest is, in fact, what has 
always led states to observe rules of international law in the 
absence of an external force able to enforce the rules. 123 
The same thing could be said of the effectiveness of U.S. courts' 
exercise of horizontal judicial review. The public generally sup-
ports the notion of limited government-that is, a government in 
which the legislative and executive branches are subject to legal 
limits on their powers-and it recognizes that such limits can be 
efficacious only if a third branch is allocated the power to interpret 
them and adjudicate violations. While the public may not agree 
with every interpretation the courts give the norms, it recognizes 
that the courts playa crucial role in the maintenance of the system, 
and it strongly supports that role. That is why the public would 
strongly object if the political branches failed to enforce the courts' 
judgments against them. 
In the end, the WTO and U.S. systems of judicial review are not 
as different as they at first appear. In both cases, the explanation 
for the efficacy of judicial review (horizontal in the case of the 
United States; vertical in the case of the WTO) is public support 
for the system and the role of the tribunals in maintaining it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The WTO's current dispute settlement system, like the institu-
tion of judicial review in the United States, is a refinement of a 
seriously flawed treaty regime. WTO dispute settlement remains 
different from judicial review in the United States in at least three 
important structural respects. First, unlike the laws of the federal 
123. See Vazquez, supra note 71. 
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government, the obligations imposed by WTO agreements are 
imposed only upon States as political bodies, and the litigants in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings are exclusively States. Sec-
ond, the U.S. courts engage in two forms of review of governmen-
tal acts: they engage in horizontal review when they review the acts 
of coordinate branches of the federal government, and they 
engage in vertical review when they review the acts of state govern-
ments. Judicial review in the WTO is almost exclusively vertical in 
nature. Third, the rulings of WTO panels and the AB are not 
backed by armed force, whereas the rulings of the u.S. courts are 
enforceable by a federal executive branch with control over an 
armed force. This last noted difference, however, is largely a differ-
ence between vertical judicial review in the United States and verti-
cal judicial review in the WTO. Horizontal review in the United 
States, especially judicial review of executive action, suffers from a 
comparable deficiency. In both cases, the fact that judicial review 
is generally effective is the result of broad support among the rele-
vant publics for the norms of the system and the tribunals' role in 
maintaining the system. 
